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Lay, dissent-

(Minn.

C~fs-
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UNITED STATES
organization)

SUMMARY:

1.

that

~ .11/otE
(.{"' t1

(./VI

J€

a

-lfle.L

Minn.

Th,:s
~•

JAYCEES

(civic

Appts challenge the lower court's finding

law prohibiting
iJ

~

«----

Timely

Federal/Civil

~

sex discrimination

t'..,.v( t-l.e

~·~

/.r

pt..-.

in

"places of

i~?-~~t?Yfz-~

public accommodation" violates the First Amendment, and is vague,

.-:--

/'
/

if applied to the all-male Jaycees.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

The Jaycees is a young

men's civic and service organization with about 295,000 regular
members.

While women can participate in some of the Jaycees's

activities as associate members, they cannot vote, hold office,
or receive certain national awards.
St.

In 1974, the Minneapolis and

Paul chapters began accepting women as full members.

The

national organization threatened to revoke their charters, and in
1978 the chapters filed complaints with the Minn. Dept. of Human
Rights
§ § 3 6 3.

under
01- .14

the

Minn.

Human

("the Act") •

Rights

Act,

Minn.

Stat.

Ann.

The Act prohibits sex discrimination

in "place[s] of public accommodation."

A "place of public accom-

modation" is defined as
a business, accommodation,~ efreshment, entertainment,
recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to
the public.
A hearing examiner found that the Jaycees had committed an unfair
discriminatory practice under the Act, and entered a cease and
desist order against the national organization.
The Jaycees

then

instituted

this

suit

in DC

(Murphy,

J.)

claiming that application of the Act to it violated a constitutionally

protected

/(

freedom

of

~

association,

that the Act was unconstitutionally __...
vague as

and,

subsequently,

cons~rued.

The DC

certified to the Minn. Sup. Ct. the question of whether the Jay-

(

cees constitutes a "place of public accommodation," within the

meaning of the Act.

Th ~inn.

answered in the affirmative.

Sup. Ct. (Otis, J., for the court)
The court ' first found that the Jay-

cees was a "business" that sold leadership training to young men.
It focused on the marketing approach of the organization 1 s recruitment program--such as referring to prospective and current
members as "customers"--and its stated aim of giving young men an
"edge" in their careers.

The court then found that the organiza-

1/

\ ..

tion was a public business.

(It

focus of the vagueness challenge.)

is this finding

that

is the

The court identified two cri-

teria to separate public from private businesses:

selectiveness

of the group in admission of members, and existence of limits on
size of the membership.

A82.

It rejected an analogy advanced

the Jaycees to the Kiwanis organization, which the court termed a
private organization;
growth," and
ships.

the court said

is unselective

..

A83.

the Jaycees

"strives

in those to whom it sells member-

Finally, the state court found that the organ i za-

tion was a "facility."

~ree

justices (Sheran, Peterson, Todd)

dissented.
The

~ejected

the Jaycees 1 s constitutional challenge. v-;A8

In its view,

reversed.

association for ends specifically men-

tioned in the First Amendment will prevail against all but "compelling" state interests, while other kinds of association may be
required

to yield

to less

imperative public needs.

court placed the Jaycees in the former category.

Al8.

The

The court found

that the personal development upon which the state court focused

---

came as a by-product of various social, civic, and ideological
activities.

----

It found that, while the Jaycees is not primarily a

7

____.

I

I

~

/,.v 7

~~

group,/ "the advocacy of

r~AJ#"V' -

-

{£)

l/1

-~~.d
f
political and pu~ ~

sele c__t _e_d_ b_y the membership, is a not insubstantial par "/)1il'
$~
it does."

A22.

Further, the court noted, while the content of

most of its resolutions has nothing to do with sex, some change
in the Jaycees's philosophical cast might reasonably be expected.
It cited the parts of the Jaycee Creed affirming the "brotherhood
of man," and its declaration that "free men" can best win economic justice through the free enterprise system.

A24.

Finally,

the court found that the Jaycees was not the only practicable way
for women to advance themselves in business, and that the state
might effectuate its policy through less instrusive means, such
as withdrawal of tax-exempt status, prohibitions
ognition

of

the

organization,

bars

on

o~

employer

official recsupport,

etc.

A30.
The court also held that the Act as construed by the Minn.
Sup. Ct. was void for vagueness.

CAS found that the state court

had not provided any discernible standard for distinguishing publie from private businesses.

In particular, if found no basis in

the record for distinguishing the Jaycees from the Kiwanis, which
is

an

all-male

organization

of

300,000 members

cross-sect ion of business and professional 1 i fe.
reach an

~ breadth

drawn

from

CAS did

a

not

challenge.

Chief Judge Lay dissented.

He noted that the Jaycees does

not advance solely men's interests, and that the type of advocacy
it has undertaken would not be curtailed or intimidated by requiring the organization to accept women.

The dissent found no

basis for believing women members would alter the organization's

(

On

creed.
usage

as

the

well

as

public-private
Rockford,

vagueness challenge,
common

Lay noted

understanding' provided

distinction,

u.s.

408

Judge

citing,

104, 110-112

e.g.,

(1972).

that

content

Grayned

v.

long

to

the

City

of

He noted that one dis-

tinction between the Kiwanis and the Jaycees was that the latter
limited

membership from

any one occupational classification

to

20% of the total.
An equally divided en bane court declined to rehear the case.
The dissenters
the

central

(Lay,

Heaney, Bright, McMi 11 ian)

purpose

of

the Jaycees

is

emphasized that

leadership

training

for

assert

that

business.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appts

(state

officials)

the question is substantial, noting that 33 states and D.C. have
statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in places
of public accommodation.
Sup. Ct.

see

(Alaska 1983);

U.S.

n.8.)

contrary to the Minn.

in this case, that the Jaycees is not a place of public

accommodation,

1981).

(Two have held,

Mass.

u.s.

Jaycees

Jaycees v.

agrees

with

the

v.

Richardet,

Bloomfield,
Minn.

~66

434 A.2d

court,

P.2d
1379

see NOW Br.

1008
(D.C.
at

34

Appts say that freedom of association does not have inde-

pendent constitutional status but rather is a derivative protection for values protected by the First Amendment, citing summary
affirmances
421
v.

u.s.

in Garcia v.

995 (1975)

Nelson,

409

u.s.

Texas State Bd.

of Medical Examiners,

(business association unprotected), and Baker
810

(1972)

(same sex marriage unprotected).

The Court has also rejected association claims in the context of
racially

discriminatory

private

schools

and

unions.

Runyon

v.

McCrary,
Corsi,

427

u.s.

326 U.S.

160,

88,

175-176

93-94

(1976);

(1945).

Railway Mail

HE?re,

there

Ass'n

v.

is no evidence

that the Jaycees's position on any social or political issue is
one

that would

state

be dictated by sex.

Appts also argue that the

interest in prohibiting sex discrimination is compelling.

Finally, appts argue that CAS focused too narrowly on the mention
of the Kiwanis in the Minn. Sup. Ct.'s opinion, which was dictum.
The public-private distinction is well-establisher'.

Appts urge

summary reversal.
New York and California have filed an amicus brief supporting
appts.

The y no t e

that their public-accommodation statutes have

recently been held applicable to th

Boy Scouts and t0 a

~

c

(

er-boating c~.

ScoiTcs---c>.~ica,

o Counc i 1 of
14 7 Cal.

App.

3d

712,

195 Cal.

m~
the Boy

Rptr.

325

(1983)

(discrimination on the basis of sexual preference); United

States

Power

Squadrons

r:

v.

State

Human

N.Y. 2d 4 01, 4 6 5 N.Y. S. 2d 8 71 ( 19 8 3) .
argu~ents

Rights

Appeal

Bd.,

59

~~

They essentially repeat the

of appts.

The National Organizat-ion for Women and other women's organizations
case0

have
rom

filed

an

this court

amicus
and

brief

supporting

the lower courts,

appts.

Citing

they say that the

criteria for distinguishing public from private groups are neither novel or elusive;

they list selectivity, size limitations,

formality of membership procedures, attributes of member ownership and government, and advertising to nonmembers.
26-27.

{ '

NOW Br. at

Appee has filed a motion to affirm.

It seeks an affirmance

on First Amendment grounds, rather than ' narrow vagueness grounds,
in order to lay to rest litigation it is facing in at least four
other states.

It says that there is a constitutional right to

association, both as an expression in itself and as a means of
protecting the expressed First Amendment guarantees, citing NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Griswold v. Conn., 381
483 (1965), and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
(1977).

u.s. 479,

u.s. 209, 231

The State has failed to articulate any compelling inter-

est to thwart the chosen purpose of this particular, essentially
private organization to serve only young men.
the

statute

as

construed

is

void

for

Appee also says

vagueness,

noting

that

greater precision is necessary when fundamental liberties are at
stake, citing,

~,

Grayned.

Appee also suggests that the stat-

ute is now overbroad, since it could reach organizations based on
ethnic and religious traditions, and that it violates equal protection, because of the different treatment of the Jaycees and
the Kiwanis.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The appeal appears proper.

No one sug-

gests otherwise, and CAS said that the suit was one "to declare
the statute, as

applied and interpreted, unconstitutional."

A2.
All the parties agree that the questions raised by this case
are

substantial.

The

case

areas of First Amendment

implicates

two

related,

unsettled

law~he protection of rights of asso-

ciation where an organization is not solely or primarily engaged

(£)

in political speech, and the protection of rights of association

for large, national organizations as opposed to smaller or narrower ones.

With four judges dissenting below, it is not obvious

to me that CA8 got the answer right.
While the case to a large extent turns on factual determinations about the nature of the Jaycees, I suspect that will always
be true in these cases; in any event, that is probably not a reason to decline plenary review of an appeal.

The factual dis-

putes, as well as the unsettled law here, seem to me to preclude
summary treatment.
The vagueness question is bound up with the merits in that an
important consideration in deciding the extent of the Jaycees's
First Amendment protection probably will be whether the holding
can be limited to essentially public groups.

{
\

not

think CA8' s

correct either.

answer

In any case, I do

to the vagueness question

is obviously

As appts assert, CA8 does appear to have focused

narrowly on the Kiwanis dictum, ignoring the selectivity and size
criteria set out elsewhere in the Minn. Sup. Ct.'s opinion.

Es-

pee ially in 1 igh t of the common use of the publ ic-pr iva te distinction, I suspect that the vagueness challenge will not prevent
the Court from reaching the merits.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I

recommend

NOTING

probable

jurisdiction.
There is a mot ion to affirm, and two amicus briefs in
support of the jurisdictional statement.
December 13, 1983

Neuhaus
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JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 16, 1984

No. 83-724

Roberts v. Jaycees
(Scheduled for argument April 18, 1984)

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
In reading the briefs in this case, I realized
that I have a possible reason to recuse myself.
I have been an active member of several single
sex clubs and organizations in the past and am still a
sustaining member of the Junior League, an honorary member
of the Soroptimists Club, and an active member of the
Women's Forum and Executive Women in Government. There is
discussion in the briefs of the possible ramifications of
this case on other single sex organizations .
.I welcome your counsel on whether I should
participate in the resolution of this case.
Sincerely,

BENCH MEMORANDUM

No. 83-724
Roberts v. The United States Jaycees

Joseph Neuhaus

April 17, 1984

Question Presented
Does

the

First Amendment prohibit Minnesota

that the all-male Jaycees accept women as members?

from

requiring

Summary of Facts & Decisions Below
'

The Jaycees is a civic and service organization that excludes
women from leadership and voting roles.

Its purpose is to incul-

cate civic interest and provide an opportunity for personal deApp.

velopment.
chapters

that

to

J.S.

wished

A-4.

On

complaint of

to admit women,

a

certain

local

state hearing examiner

found that the Jaycees' rule limiting full membership to men violated the state's anti-discrimination statute.

The Jaycees then

sued in federal DC, which certified a question to the Minn S Ct.
The S Ct held that the Jaycees is a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the state law.

Noting that the leg-

islature

construction of

had

expressly

required

a

liberal

II

law, A-73,

-

the

\\

the court found that the Jaycees was a business that

sold membership in an organization whose aim is the advancement
of its members, A-79.

The DC held the application of the law to

the Jaycees constitutional.

CAB reversed.

It held that the ap-

plication of the statute to the Jaycees infringed on their First
Amendment right to join together
and public causes.

in order to advocate political

It also held the law as construed by the Minn

S Ct unconstitutionally vague because that court said that the
law would not apply to the Kiwanis.

Discussion
I

consider

the Jaycees

vagueness and overbreadth arguments

insubstantial, and this memo discusses at length only the First
Amendment challenge.

In brief,

I

think the vagueness argument

probably misinterprets the Minn S Ct's reference to the Kiwanis

'e:Ld:c

~gy;.n
I

club.

It would be silly to

cause of an off-hand reference

the statute merely be-

in the opinion.

On balance the

state court provided adequate guidelines to distinguish between
''
public and private IIbusinesses.

The overbreadth challenge depends

on the Jaycees' claim that if they are a place of public accommodation, many other groups--such as religious or ethnic groups-would be as well.

The fact

is,

however,

that the Minn S Ct's

application of the statute to the Jaycees depended heavily on the

- ....

particular mix of business and nonbusiness aspects of the organi...

-~

zation.

--.......

.......

The record does not reveal whether the other groups the

Jaycees cite have the same mix.
1.

Freedom of association generally.

-

While the protection

given to the right to associate with whom one chooses is far from
~

~

defined, what seems reasonably clear is that whatever protection
there

is of association will be at its greatest in two si tua-

t~sG1Jhen

"privacy"

right~~e

implicated, an<i'Jhen the associ-

ation is involved in protected First Amendment speech.

Each of

these poles of greatest protection can be illustrated by an extreme example.
tion
ence.

that

The family or the marital couple is an associa-

receives

the

E.g., Moore v.

validating
grandsons);

ordinance

highest protection from state inter ferEast Cleveland,

barring

Griswold v.

431

grandmother

Connecticut,

nance barring use of contraceptives).

381

u.s.
from

u.s.

494

(1977)

living
479

(in-

with

(1965)

her

(ordi-

Groups engaged in advocacy

of political or public causes also may be interfered with only
for compelling state interests.
449 (1958)

E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357

u.s.

(invalidating order requiring disclosure of membership

1 is t s ) ;

Bates v • C i t y of L i t t 1 e Rock ,

(same); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424

3 61 U. S •

u.s.'

516 ,

52 4

( 19 6 0 )

1, 15, 25 (197-6).

In

other areas, associational freedoms probably receive less protecThus a

tion.

business--at least one of sufficient size not to

implicate core pr i vac~·· concerns--can be prevented from excluding

,

blacks or women despite the owners' claim of freedom to associate
with

whom

States, 379

they

like.

u.s.

Cf.

241, 250

Heart

of

Atlanta

Motel

v.

United

(upholding application of Civil

(1964)

Rights Act to motel--associational freedoms not considered) ; Run.YQn.... v.

McCrary,

427

u.s.

160, 176

(private school may be

(1975)

forced to admit black children).
In this case, it is plain that the state has advanced a general interest that is of the highest importance.
poses,

For these pur-

there probably can be no distinction between the state's

interest in combatting sexual discrimination and its interest in
ending

racial

discrimination.

Minnesota

that the one is as important as the other.
therefore,

can

certainly

decide

As a general matter,

it is not necessary for the Court to consider the ex-

tent of the Constitution's protection for associations that are
distant

from

the

privacy

and

speech

concerns

discussed

above.

The state's interest clearly is sufficient to override any but
these central associational
this case thus

interests.

The crucial question in

is how close the Jaycees'

interest in excluding

women is to privacy and First Amendment speech. 1

1 It might also be argued that the state's interest in
ending discrimination attenuates as it reaches increasingly
Footnote continued on next page.

2.

Privacy.

The nature of freedom of association as it im-

plicates privacy concerns is that there are certain personal relationships
scendent.

that our

society believes are fundamental or tran-

A person has a right to enter into and maintain such

relationships without any but the most essential or traditional
restrictions.

The idea is that these relationships are vital to

the autonomy and dignity of the individual.

This kind of freedom

of association has not been extended beyond the family, as far as
I

have

grandsons),
(1974)
house).

Compare

found.

Moore,

with Village of

supra

(grandmother

Belle Terre v.

living

Boraas,

u.s.

1

(ordinance may bar unrelated persons from living in single
This Court has upheld laws requiring private schools and

nonselective private swimming pools to admit blacks.
v.

416

with

McCrary,

Wheaton-Haven

427

u.s.

160,

Recreation

175-179

Ass'n,

(1976)

410

(school);

u.s.

431

See Runyon
Tillman v.

(1973)

(pool--no

constitutional question raised).
Nevertheless,

it

may

be

that

other

relationships

found to have at least some heightened protection.
of

two examples.

First,

there are groups

that

will

be

I can think

are defined by

intimate associations.
I am not sure this is true, however.
While it is true that ending discrimination in businesses and on
mass transit has a more obvious effect than ending it , in more
intimate settings like clubs and fraternities, I do not think it
can said with any confidence that the state has a lesser interest
in the latter than in the former.
The state presumably is
entitled to eliminate discrimination root and branch, and its
interest in doing so may be as great in small institutions as it
is in large ones.
So I think it is more helpful to speak in
terms of the constitutional protection of the association
increasing rather than in terms of the state's interest
decreasing.

intimacy or exclusivity.

If a state sought to force fraternities

or private men's clubs to accept women or blacks
some cases}

(or whites, in

the Constitution conceivably could offer protection.

To require less selective admissions would be to destroy the essence of the association, a result that might conflict with the
central and traditional values of our society.

See Moore, supra,

at 503 (limits on substantive due process come from "'respect for
the

teachings

values

history

that underlie our

Griswold}.
which

of

[and]

solid

society'"}

recognition of

the basic

(quoting Justice Harlan in

Second, and related, there are certain situations in

homogeneity

is widely recognized as

socially beneficial;

the most obvious example is single-sex education.

Thus, it may

be that requiring the Cub Scouts to accept girls would detract
from

the

efficacy

Mississippi
(1982}

of

the education that Scouts receive.

University

(Powell,

J.,

for

Women

dissenting}

v.

Hogan,

458

u.s.

718,

Cf.
739

(noting "the continuing expres-

sions that single-sex institutions may offer singular advantages
to their

students"}

(MUW does

not control,

of course:

it only

deals with the constitutional limitations on state discriminatory
action,

not with what limits a state may place on private dis-

criminatory conduct}.
The Jaycees does

not press

the

argument

that

its claim of

associational rights is linked to these privacy or autonomy values, and on the record here I do not think it could.

,,

,,

It hardly

can be said that selectivity is the essence of the organization,
or that requiring it to take women will destroy it.

The Jaycees

is utterly unselective about choosing its members, requiring only

------------------

11.

that they be men between 18 and 35.

It encourages as large and

diverse

The

a

membership

as

possible.

----

Minnesota

chapters

at

-

issue here use no selection committee nor any backgroun 9.,. checks.

-

-

---

Moreover, the Jaycees do not suggest that the

Appts' Br. at 8.

things they do are done better in some constitutionally significant way when only men are present.

Its civic functions are, at

least as a general matter, open to the public.

In fact,

since

women belong as associate members, it appears that women are not
excluded entirely from virtually anything the organization does-except vote and award officers and honors.

These functions are

hardly at the center of the club, and no one argues otherwise.
In

short,

the

Jaycees

selective men's clubs and
strictions on membership.

___

to ....,___
advance a
ciates

is

---·

infringed by a

criminate
not,

against

since

state's

str ~::: im

so

a

that

distinguishable

from other

tha ~ their

state

other,

more

institutions with sex re-

right to choose

requirement

class.

"choice"
sex

from

These other institutions may be able ~

certain

little

decision

is

But

appears

discrimination

that

this

their ~

asso-

they not dis-

organization can

to

be

involved.

in

admissions

The

to

the

Jaycees is an evil needful of correction is legitimate and here
controls, unless the Jaycees'

First Amendment speech rights are

infringed.
3.

First Amendment speech.

to protect

and

further

The right to associate in order

the ability

to exercise

the enumerated

First Amendment freedoms is more fully developed in the case law
than

the

privacy

concerns addressed

above.

It

is well

estab-

lished that a content-neutral regulation may be invalidated when

applied to some organizations if it "is likely to affect adversely the ability of
their

collective

Alabama, 357

effort

u.s.

cussion today,

[the organization]
to

foster

and its members to pursue

[their]

449, 462-463 (1958).

beliefs."

NAACP

v.

As you noted in our dis-

the speech or beliefs may "pertain to political,

economic, religious or cul tur a! matters," id., at 460.

The cru-

cia! question is whether the state regulation is in fact likely
"to affect adversely" the organization's speech efforts.
The Jaycees offer

two arguments that admitting women would

affect its speech. ~

it says,

its very existence consti-

tutes speech--an expression of its belief that "young men need or
deserve such an organization."

Appee Br. at 19.

Thus, changing

the membership of any membership organization always influences
its speech.

Ibid.

~ the

Jaycees points to its "positions

on public issues," id., at 20, saying that requiring it to take
women would alter the organization's focus on issues of special
concern to young men.
The first view has some appeal because it keeps the courts
out of the question entirely, but it is probably too broad.

Many

important economic actors happen to be membership organizations,
and

the

state

surely

discrimination-free.

has

a

right

to

keep

the

marketplace

The most obvious examples are labor unions.

It cannot be that labor unions can exclude blacks or women solely
because

the

union's

existence

stands

for

the

proposition

white working men "need or deserve such an organization."
e.g.,

Railway Mail

Ass'n

v.

Corsi,

(union may not exclude blacks).

326

u.s.

88,

93-94

that
See,
(1945)

The same is true of other eco-

~dAf~

..

• 4 ~oe.

~

nomic actors.
nonselective

It is Minnesota's view that the Jaycees,

~ elling

1

of

personal

development

and

~ n i _.!;s

1

-----

because it is a membership organization it can avoid the scrutiny

If its status as a membership organization does not automatically protect it, then the Jaycees seek refuge in the fact that
(The Jaycees does not ad-

vance any claim relating to nonpolitical speech.

This choice is

sound: political speech is entitled to the greatest First Amendment protection, so if the Jaycees cannot win here, other speech
It appears here that the Jaycees must make

some showing that admitting women will influence its speech--that
is, that the state restriction will somehow inhibit its exercise
of its First Amendment rights.

u.s.,

at 176

See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427

(school had not shown that admitting blacks would

"inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of [its segregationist] ideas").

While I am reluctant to have the courts mak-

ing these determinations, I am inclined to agree that it is neeessary.

Otherwise, undeniably important political entities--such

as the Democratic or Republican parties--or economic actors that
make political pronouncements--such as Mobil Oil Co.--could discriminate on a claim that whatever speech they make would be influenced

by

altering

their

membership

~

~f
,

72&f..~
~

#.a:

I

~

that would otherwise be applicable.

will not help it.)

t!~.k

leadership

----~----------~-----------~
- -think
~
training,
is such an economic actor.
I do not
that simply

they take positions on public issues.

~

or

staff.

Such

claims

should be subjected to some scrutiny, to avoid exclusion of minorities from mainstream politics or markets.

Nonetheless, some

deference should be given to the organization's choices in this
regard.
The

case

thus

boils down

to whether

admitting women would

require the Jaycees to alter the nature or expression of its public positions.

-

The Jaycees' best argument on this point is that

while the "women's" position on any given issue is not certain,
~

admitting women will force the organization to take positions on

------------------ ·---------------------------------------------

certain "women's issues" that it now avoids, such as the ERA or
abortion.

-----..

I

am dubious.

I

am not convinced that one can say

with any fair degree of certainty that abortion is an issue that
women, as opposed to men, care about and renewed draft registration or the war in Vietnam were not.

As we discussed, moreover,

deference to the organization's choices is not called for because
I doubt that the Jaycees chose to exclude women because its political positions might be influenced.

That is,

I do not think

the Jaycees has made a choice to allow only men into its organization so it will present the young men's political position: the
speech part of the organization is a sideline, incidental to its
main aim of personal and career development.

It would be anoma-

lous to uphold the organization's restrictions on its membership
in order to allow it to conduct what appears to be a minor part
of its activities.

Thus,

since excluding women appears to have

little to do with protected First Amendment speech, and since any
other claim to associational freedom in a nonselective club must
fall to the state's interest in ending sex discrimination, I recommend reversal.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-724
KATHRYN R. ROBERTS, ACTING COMMISSIONER,
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
ET AL. v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address a conflict between a
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association asserted by members of a private organization. In the
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the organization's members. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now reverse.
I
A
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees,
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue

"such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and development of young
men's civic organizations in the United States, designed
to inculcate in the individual membership of such orga-
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nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for personal development
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in the affairs of their community,
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men of all nations." Quoted
in Brief for Appellee 2.
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of membership, including individual or regular members, associate individual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while
associate membership is available to individuals or groups
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat
lower than those charged regular members, may not ·vote,
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards programs. The bylaws define a
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute
existing in any community within the United States, organized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each
local chapter, with a national president and board of directors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time
about 11,915 associate members. The national organization's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that
women associate members make up about two percent of the
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56.
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the
local chapters, although the state and national organizations
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and national organizations. The national headquarters employs a
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that
are designed to enhance individual development, community
development, and members' management skills. These materials include courses in public speaking and personal finances as well as community programs related to charity,
sports, and public health. The national office also makes
available to members a range of personal products, including
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts.
The programs, products, and other activities of the organization are all regularly featured in publications made available
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future."
B

In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of directors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation
of the national organization's bylaws for about ten years.
The national organization has imposed a number of sanctions
on the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to count
their membership in computing votes at national conventions.
In December 1978, the president of the national organization advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the national board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women
from full membership required by the national organization's
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act),
which provides in part:
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982).
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." I d.,
§ 363.01, subd. 18.
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to believe that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner.
Before that hearing took place, however, the national organization brought suit against various state officials, appellants here, in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged
that, by requiring the organization to accept women as regular members, application of the Act would violate the male
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association.
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dismissed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be renewed in the event the state administrative proceeding resulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees.
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights Department hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees orga-
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nization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered
the national organization to cease and desist from discriminating against any member or applicant for membership on
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minnesota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office ofHearing
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979)
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109.
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32.
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the affinnative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d
764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public business facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jaycees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues;
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits duespaying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a
public business "facility'' in that it conducts its activities at
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at
768-774.
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d
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1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees]
does," the organization's right to select its members is protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First
Amendment. I d., at 1570. It further decided that application of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership policies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id.,
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsible for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court concluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organization is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at
1573-1574.

Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minnesota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Kiwanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act.
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "private" organizations from the "public accommodations" covered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1576-1578.
II

Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line
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of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion by the· State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particular, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor,
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to
consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive
association.
A
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highjy personal r~ions~most notably those arising in a famil"b(sontz~ a substantial measure of sanctuary from uri}u tified
interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska , 262
U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every

Insert for p. 8 at beginning of last paragraph.

The personal affiliations that exemplify these
considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant
limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this
sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the
creation and sustenance of a family--marriage, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, supra; childbirth,

~,

Carey v. Population Services

Int'l, supra; the raising and education of children, e.g., Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation with
one's

relatives,~,

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, supra.

Family relationships, by their nature,
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consideration that may underlie this type of
ional
protection, we have noted that :fami~ have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between
the individual and the power of the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482-485 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 535. See also Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556, 575 (1974); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462 (1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). More- ~
over, the constitutional shelter afforded f-amil-y~relationships
~~
reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting~~ relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, e. g.,
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977);
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632,
639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
-:(8eme s:J9eeial efiaP~-el~ipe-s~9ilt
~Btrlimitatiens on-the seep8 of tllii k.ind..of..o9niltitat~
pretesti9n. Ey their nature;-a\:leh ~latioo.ships involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's lif~-~n other things,
therefore, they are distinguished byA.attFib1iil81ii Q;i iRtiHi&8S' .J<... ~--

~
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relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
c c 1/13 ~~a ''ct I·~J
begin and maintain the affiliation, J:and seclusion from others
in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter,
only; a PeWieftShi.p.-that-ea:n-be degep.ibecl-as.J.itntimate" SQeme-'like y to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element
of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lackin
qualities ef iBtimae~ such as a large business enterpriseseems remote from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the
selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees. Compare
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims
to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the
State. Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S.
160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not
mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with
any recision in this case, however, for several features of
the Jaycees c ear Y. ~priv~f tl:l:e iBtirtutey that might reB
~
ice of assoeiatee 'NeFtl:l:y of constitutional
protection.
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups. At the
time of the state administrative hearing, the Minneapolis
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local
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chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for membership, and new members are routinely recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176.
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969)
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same).
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one
another, including many of the organization's various community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103.
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the
formation and maintenance of the association involves the
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly,
we conclude that the Jaycees chap~ lack the distinctive
characteristics ef: iHtiffiate ttsseeiatie that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women. We turn therefore to consider the extent to
which application of the Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of expressive association.
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B
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances could not
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290,
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g.
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977).
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or .
withhold benefits from individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g.,
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can
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be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to
express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
supra, at 234-235.
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 488;
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shel'ton v. Tucker, 364
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppression of speech, does not distinguish, between prohibited and
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not license enforcement authorities to administer the statute on
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the
Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hampering the organization's ability to express its views. Instead,
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768.
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That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest
order.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an example of public accommodations laws that were adopted by
some States beginning a decade before enactment of their
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215,
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public
accommodations. I d., at 19, 25. In response to that decision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations. These laws provided the primary means for
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of California and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom discrimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In
1973, the ~innesota legislature added discrimination on the
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute.
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158,
2164.
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms.
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces in-

83-724-0PINION
14

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

dividuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both· deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and
cultural life. See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These concerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, which forbids race
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently
because of their race.
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional
definition of public accommodations that reaches various
forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W.
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy and of
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political
and social integration that have historically plagued certain
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disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v.
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v.
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its conclusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minnesota court noted the various commercial programs and benefits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d,
at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state
interests.
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced
those interests through the least restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national
and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570;
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632
(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or
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philosophies different from those of its existing members.
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (recognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'").
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v.
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U. S., at 483.
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Appeals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women
members might have a different view or agenda with respect
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as
voting members will change the message communicated by
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported
by the record. In claiming that women might have a different attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a
different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Although such generalizations may or may not have a statistical
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decision-
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making that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See,
e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti,-- U.S.--,----- (1984);
Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S., at-----. In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted
by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change
the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142,
151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498,
508 (1975).
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of
invidious discrimination cause unique evils that government
has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the
point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact, the actual practice of invidious discrimination by an
individual or group-as distinguished from its advocacy-is
entitled to no constitutional protection. Hishon v. King &
Spalding,-- U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976).
Compare NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982)
(peaceful picketing) with id., at 916 (violence). In prohibiting such practices in the distribution of publicly available
goods and services, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds
precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns" the State and abridges no more speech or associational
freedom than is necessary to accomplish that purpose. See
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, ante, at-- U. S.
-,-(1984).
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III
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minnesota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-forvagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v.
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). Therequirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U.S.--,----(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404
(1966).
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its
face or as construed in this case. In determining that the
Act reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used
a number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of
public facilities-typically employed in determining the applicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See,
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F. 2d 96
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33,
aff'd mem., 67 N. J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See generally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construe-
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tion of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It nevertheless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a constitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "private" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals,
however, we read the illustrative reference to the
Kiwanis Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for choosing members on the basis of specific and selective criteria, as simply providing a further refinement of the
standards used to determine whether an organization is "public" or "private." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting).
By offering this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court's opinion provided the statute with more, rather than
less, definite content.
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's contention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the membership decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes.
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jaycees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W.
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt
limiting constructions that would exclude private groups
from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act,
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk
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of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct.
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982).
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address a conflict between a
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association asserted by members of a private organization. In the
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the organization's members. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now reverse.
I
A

The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees,
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue
"such educational and charitable purposes as will proMd- ~r
mote and foster the growth and development of young
~ i.L_~ ~ <: (~~ civic organizations in the United States, designed
k r ~ f ~ w-' to inculcate in the individual membership of such orga-
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nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for personal development
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in the affairs of their community,
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men of all nations." Quoted
in Brief for Appellee 2.
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of membership, including individual or regular members, associate individual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while
associate membership is available to individuals or groups
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat
lower than those charged regular members, may not vote,
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards programs. The bylaws define a
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute
existing in any community within the United States, organized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each
local chapter, with a national president and board of directors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time
about 11,915 associate members. The national organization's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that
women associate members make up about two percent of the
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56.
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the
local chapters, although the state and national organizations
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and national organizations. The national headquarters employs a
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that
are designed to enhance individual development, community
development, and members' management skills. These materials include courses in public speaking and personal finances as well as community programs related to charity,
sports, and public health. The national office also makes
available to members a range of personal products, including
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts.
The programs, products, and other activities of the organization are all regularly featured in publications made available
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future."
B

In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of di- ·
rectors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation
of the national organization's bylaws for about ten years.
The national organization has imposed a number of sanctions
on the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to. count
their membership in computing votes at national conventions.
In December 1978, the president of the national organization advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the national board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women
from full membership required by the national organization's
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act),
which provides in part:
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. §363.03, subd. 3 (1982).
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." I d.,
§ 363.01, subd. 18.
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to believe that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner.
Before that hearing took place, however, the national organization brought suit against various state officials, appellants here, in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged
that, by requiring the organi;t.:ation to accept women as regular members, application of the Act would violate the male
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association.
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dismissed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be renewed in the event the state administrative proceeding resulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees.
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights Department hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees orga-
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nization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered
the national organization to cease and desist from discriminating against any member or applicant for membership on
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minnesota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office of Hearing
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979)
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109.
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32.
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d
764 (1981)~ Based on the Act's legislative history, the court
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public business facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jaycees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues;
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits duespaying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a
public business "facility'' in that it conducts its activities at
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at
768-774.
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d
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1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees]
does," the organization's right to select its members is protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First
Amendment. I d., at 1570. It further decided that application of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership policies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id.,
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsible for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court concluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organization is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at
1573-1574.

Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minnesota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Kiwanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act.
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "private" organizations from the "public accommodations" covered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1576-1578.
II

Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line
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respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
~ 1'-A mendment-speech, assembl , petition for the redress of
grievances, and t e exerciSeOf religion.
e onstitution
guaranteeSfree<i
o associatiOn of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particular, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor,
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to
consider separately the effect of a pl ·n the Mi e ta statute to e aycees on what could be called its member '
edom o m 1ma e associa wn an t eir freedom of expressive
A
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of hi hly e sonal relationships, most notably those arising i
contex , a suDSrantial measure of sanctuary from u · · ed
interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every

83-724-0PINION
8

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional
protection, we have noted that family bonds have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between
the individual and the power of the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482-485 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 535. See also Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556, 575 (1974); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462 (1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U. S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded family relationships
reflects the realization that individuals draw mucn of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting such relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, e. g.,
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977);
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632,
639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
f\ Some s ecial characteristics of family relationships suggest
relevant limi ations on t e scope offfifSkin o f constftiitional
protectiOn.
y err na ure, sue relations ps mvo ve eep
attacliillents and commitments to the necessarily few OUier
ind1v1 ua s WI n w om one s ares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things,
therefore, they are distinguished by attributes of intimacy-

----_______..
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rel~ive~ess,

a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
begin and maintain the affiliation, an sec usion from others
in critical aspects of the relationship. ~ general matter, }
onl a relationshi that can be described as "intimate" seems
~
likely to re ect the cons1 erations th_at have Ieat'o an un er. _ ;:::::;"'
stan ing o free om of--a8Soeiation as an mfrms1c e ement
o persOiTiil lilie~ onverse y, an association lacking the
qualities of intimacy-such as a large business enterprise- LJf-- ~ seems remote from the concerns g~ving r1se to this constitu- ~ ./.--.../£/. _
tiona! protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubt~1
edly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the a- -~
selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations ~
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees. Compare
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
3
Between these 'poles: of course, lies a broad range of
hum~that maymake greater or les~laims
to cons 1tutwna rotection om pa 1cu ar incursions by the
State:-ne erminmg e limits of state authority over an in- ~
dividual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that
relationsh!£'~ o~tive characteristics locate lt on a spectrum
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal atee gen
nyon v. cCrary, 427 U.'""S.
tacmnen s.
160, 187-189 (197 (POWELL, J. concurring). We need not ~
mark the potential
· ·
t points on this terrain with
any precision in this case, however, for several features of ~
the Jaycees clearly deprive it of the intimacy that might ren~
der its members' choice of associates worthy of constitutional
{)
protection.
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the
At the
Jaycees are large and basi call unselective grou
time of the state admmistrative earmg, the Minneapolis
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local

L

83-724-0PINION
10

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for membership, and new members are routinely recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176.
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969)
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same).
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one
another, including many of the organization's various community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103.
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the
f~d maintenance of the association involves the
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly,
we conclude that the Jaycees cha ters lack the distinctive
characteristics o intimate association
ord constitutional protection o e ecision of its members to exclude women. We turn therefore to consider the extent to
which application of the Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of expressive association.

----

~,.

I~t a
T

~
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B

V

An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances could not
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaran e .
ee, e. g., ent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290,
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on behalf of ~ is especially important in preserving
political -allilcuttural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g.
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding ri ht to a§.§..O.Giate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of p~al, social, economic, educational reli 'ous and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware o., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977).
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or
withhold benefits from individua.t%because of their membership in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g.,
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can
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be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or a arrs o an association than a regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desrre. Such a
regu a 10n rna mp r t e a 1 'ty o eo iginal members to
express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
supra, at 234-235.
(
,,
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, abso u e.
· ge n o llatrlglitmay be justified
by regwations adopted to serve compelling state mterests,
unrelated to thesuppression o11deas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 488;
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at th~uppres
sion of speech, does not d1stmgriish between prohibited and
pe~vity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not license enforcement authorities to administer the statute on
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the
Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hampering the organization's ability to express its views. Instead,
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768.
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That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest
order.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an~m
ple of .,public accommodations j aws that were adopted by
some States begiruung a decade before enactment of their
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215,
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public
accommodations. Id., at 19, 25. In response to that decision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations. These laws provided the primary means for
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of California and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom discrimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In
1973, the Minnesota legislature added discrimination on the
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute.
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158,
2164.
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms.
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces in-

l
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dividuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both· deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society
the bene~ts of wide part~ation in political, economic, and
cultural life. Se~ e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These concerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, which forbids race
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
ac~ess to public establishments.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently
because of their race.
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional
definition of public accommodations that reaches various
forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W.
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy and of
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removin the barriers to economic advancement and olitical
and social integration that ave historically plagued certain

-

__......

_____,

83-724-0PINION
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

15

disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v.
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v.
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its conclusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minnesota court noted the various commercial programs and benefits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d,
at 772. Ass~ring wo~n ~u~~ess to such goods, privileges, and a~ C!early- fUrthers compelling state
interests.
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced
those interests through the least restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national
and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570;
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632
(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or

;~
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philosophies different from those of its existing members.
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (recognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'").
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v.
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U. S., at 483.
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Appeals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women
members might have a different view or agenda with respect
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as
voting members will change the message communicated by
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported
by the record. In claiming that women might have a different attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a
different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Although such generalizations may or may not have a statistical
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decision-

83-724-0PINION
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

17

making that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See,
e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti,-- U.S.--,----- (1984);
Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S., at-----. In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted
by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change
the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142,
151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498,
508 (1975).
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of
invidious discrimination cause unique evils that government
has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the
point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact, the actual practice of invidious discrimination by an
individual or group-as distinguished om 1ts advocacy-is
enti ed to no constitutional protection. Hishon v. King &
Spalding,-- U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976).
Compare NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982)
(peaceful picketing) with id., at 916 (violence). In prohibiting such practices in the distribution of publicly available
goods and services, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds
precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns" the State and abridges no more speech or associational
freedom than is necessary to accomplish that purpose. See
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, ante, at-- U. S.
-,-(1984).

I
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III
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minnesota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-forvagueness doctrine reflects tfie principle that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v.
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). Therequirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U. S. - - , - - - - (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404
(1966).
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its
face or as construed in this case. In determining that the
Act reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used
a number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of
public facilities-typically employed in determining the applicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See,
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's ChristianAss'n, 397 F. 2d 96
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33,
aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See generally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construe-
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tion of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It nevertheless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a constitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "private" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals,
however, we read the illustrative reference to the
Kiwanis Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for choosing members on the basis of specific and selective criteria, as simply providing a further refinement of the
standards used to determine whether an organization is "public" or "private." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting).
By offering this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court's opinion provided the statute with more, rather than
less, definite content.
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's contention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the membership decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes.
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jaycees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W.
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt
limiting constructions that would exclude private groups
from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act,
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk
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of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct.
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982).
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed
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June 12, 1984

CHAMI!II!:RS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

83-724 - Roberts v.

u.s.

Jaycees

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

When this case came up, I concluded I would "hear
them out" and then decide on participation.
A century ago (or is it a half?), I was President
of the St. Paul Jr. Association. Later, I was national
vice president. With some others I advocated that
business and professional women be admitted on the same
bas i s as men. It was an idea whose time had not arrived.
It has now, even though the Minnesota opinion leaves
something to be desired.
As of now, it seems to me it would be better if I
"recuse."

.ilupumt <!f&turi ltf tlf.t ~ .i\bttt.e'

._u.lfin!lhtn. ~. <!f.

211~"''

CHAtt.4BERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 13, 1984

Re:

83-724 - Roberts v. United States
Jaycees

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

Jen o i'I3/84
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
83-724 Roberts v. US Jaycees

You asked

for my comments on your proposed note to WJB.

I

see now that the note is concerned only with his choice of labels
for the idea he is developing.
in quotes on p.

9,

Since he uses the term "intimate"

I am not sure that readers will think he is

talking about the normal sense of the word, rather than the sense
that is defined in the carryover sentence on page 9.
less,

it

is probably true, as you suggest,

Neverthe-

that the label will

exert a subtle pressure in a direction that would tend to exclude
at least the larger clubs of the sort you are talking about.
I have three suggestions on your letter.

F~,

gested new language for one sentence on page 2.
gest deleting the example you give on page 3.
it is intended to show.
example of a large club.

I have sug,...

Se~ I

sug-

I am not sure what

I do not think it is needed merely as an
And it may not be self-evident to all

the Justices which side of the line of constitutional protection

this particular club falls.

T~

one other sentence of WJB's

I

opinion might also be cited to him, to wit, the final sentence of
the only full paragraph on page 9.

June 14, 19A4
·~

,,

83-724 Roberts v.

'

;r~ycees

·T

" Dear Bill:
I am circulating the enclosen comments on your
opinion to the Conference b~cause of the lateness of the
Term.

Normally I would exchanqe views Privately - as
you and I frequently do. But in view of our hope to conclude this Term in another couple of wPeks, it mav bP helpful to get our thouqhts out on the table Promptly for all of
us to see.
I do think your opinion is excellent, and with
modest changes along the lines sugoested, it will be a~other
hallmark decision.
~

...

Sincer:-eJy,

Justice Brennan

(,''

lfp/ss
,,

Jni±th

~tt}tttntt QI!tttri ltf firt
~taitS'
,ru!p:ttgbm, ~. <!J. 20gtJt.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR.

June 14, 1984

Re: Roberts v. United States Jaycees, No. 83-724
Dear Lewis:
I'm delighted to adopt your very helpful suggestions
and will incorporate them in the next circulation as per the
enclosed. Does this do the job?
Sincerely,

;3t

WJB, Jr.

Justice Powell

·~

Dear Bill:
~·

Subject to the suggestions mentioned
be happy to join your ~1ell written opinion.
~.

"
You identify protected ~ fr~edom of association".
"two distinct senses" (p. 6, 7). I am with you, and what
you have written, with respect to the second of these:
activities protected by the First Amendment such as speech,
assembly, etc.
"

/It seerns to me, however, that vou unnecessarily
limit the first "sense" - "human relationships" - too narrowly. The onlv example given ic::; the 11 family context", and
, you emphasize the n<=>cessity that the relationships be "inti- ·:_.
mate".• See particularly the first full sentence on paqe 9, ·
the final sentence of the full paragraph on p. a, and the
next to last sentencP on page 10.
, This opinion is likely to have its
feet when a~plied to the enormous number and variety of
clubs that are so tyoicallv American. Intimacy is
to be a characteristic of most of these.
be small.
Rather than say that "only a relationship that'!! Can
be described as 'intimate'" is likely to come within the
concept of personal libertv (p. 9), would it not be more
judicious simply to inentify - without indicating relative
importance - some of the considerations that may be relevant: e.g., selectivity, size, purpose, congeniality, and
othe~ characte~iotics that mav in pa~ticular c~ses be
·
important.
Very modest changes in some of the language on
pages 7-10 would leave open for consideration on a case-bycase basis the almost infinite types of "club" situations in
our country.
The remainder of your opinion is first rate.
SincerE-ly,
Justice Brennan
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cc: The
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CHIIMIIERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 14, 1984

No. 83-724

/

/

Roberts v. United States

Dear Bill,
I have read with interest your
exceedingly difficult case. While I
Part IIB, I doubt that I will be abl
it
now stands. Memories of New York v
fr~r me to be eager -t~o~g~o~a~1-o-n~~~~~~
exposition of constitutional rights to intimate association.
I am most uncomfortable with the material in Part IIA that
begins on page 7 and ends at the end of the last full
paragraph on page 9.

I

Would you be willing to shorten Part IIA to something
along the following lines instead?
The Court has previously held that the
formation and preservation of certain kinds
of highly personal relationships, most
notably those arising in a family context,
find some measure of constitutional
protection. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 u.s. 390, 399 (1923) 1 Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510, 534-535 (1925) 1
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205, 232 (1973) 1
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 u.s. 374, 383-386
(1978). The relationships involved in these
cases were distinguished by several
attributes--relative smallness, high degree
of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the
relationship.

2.

Whatever the precise scope of the
constitutional protection involved in these
cases may be, it certainly does not extend to
an organization of 295,000 members divided
into 7,400 local chapters that accepts into
membership any and all male applicants within
certain age groups. [From here on I would be
prepared to go along with the material of
your Part IIA that starts with the runover
paragraph on pp. 9-10 and ends at the bottom
of p.lO. J

I

Lewis has also written you about Part IIA and I do
not disagree with his suggestions.
I also wonder if your Part IIB might not be adjusted
to include a somewhat greater emphasis on the commercial
nature of the Jaycees' operation. I don't have anyth ing
specific in mind here, but I do wish to avoid deciding the
rights of, say, the Girl Scouts, the Boy Scouts, or other
single-sex or single-race organizations that are less
commercial in character than the Jaycees.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

June 15 , 1984

83 - 724 Roberts v .

~avc~es

Dear Bill:
~he changes in the draft you were good enough to
"nark up" are entirely satisfactory with respect to the
"personal affiliations" that - as you say - "attend the cre~tion and sustenanc~ of a family • • • "

The cJarification you are making in the final sentence of the full paragraph on p . 9 is Particularly helpful.
I think some additional guidance would be given if this concluding sentence were enlarged as follows:
"We need not mark the potentially significant
points on this terrain with any precision .
We note only that factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, and other characteristics that in a
particular case may be pertinent . In this
case, however , several features of the Jaycees clearly place the organization outside
of the category of relationships worthy of
this kind of constitutional protection."
If you could accommodate me on this clarification,
you will have mv join note promptly .

Sincerely ,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

.®u:prtntt <!fou.rt of tfrt 'J!Urittb ~hdts
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 15, 1984

No. 83-724-Roberts v. United States Jaycees
Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

/~
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 83-724 - Roberts v. United States Jaycees
Dear Bill:
At the end of your opinion, will you please add the
following:
"JUSTICE BLACKMUN
decision of this case."

took

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-724
KATHRYN R. ROBERTS, ACTING COMMISSIONER,
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
ET AL. v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address a conflict between a
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association asserted by members of a private organization. In the
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the organization's members. We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. - - , and now reverse.
I
A

The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees,
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue
"such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and development of young
men's civic organizations in the United States, designed
to inculcate in the individual membership of such orga-

1

83-724-0PINION
2

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for personal development
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in the affairs of their community,
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men of all nations." Quoted
in Brief for Appellee 2.
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of membership, including individual or regular members, associate individual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while
associate membership is available to individuals or groups
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat
lower than those charged regular members, may not vote,
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards programs. The bylaws define a
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute
existing in any community within the United States, organized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each
local chapter, with a national president and board of directors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time
about 11,915 associate members. The national organization's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that
women associate members make up about two percent of the
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56.
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the
local chapters, although the state and national organizations
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and national organizations. The national headquarters employs a
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that
are designed to enhance individual development, community
development, and members' management skills. These materials include courses in public speaking and personal finances as well as community programs related to charity,
sports, and public health. The national office also makes
available to members a range of personal products, including
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts.
The programs, products, and other activities of the organization are all regularly featured in publications made available
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future."
B

In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of directors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation
of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years. The
national organization has imposed a number of sanctions on
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to count
their membership in computing votes at national conventions.
In December 1978, the president of the national organization advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the national board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women
from full membership required by the national organization's

83-724-0PINION
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act),
which provides in part:
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982).
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." I d.,
§ 363.01, subd. 18.
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to believe that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner.
Before that hearing took place, however, the national organization brought suit against various state officials, appellants here, in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged
that, by requiring the organization to accept women as regular members, application of the Act would violate the male
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association.
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dismissed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be renewed in the event the state administrative proceeding resulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees.
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights Department hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclu-
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sions oflaw. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees organization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered
the national organization to cease and desist from discriminating against any member or applicant for membership on
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minnesota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office ofHearing
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979)
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109.
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32.
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d
764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public business facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jaycees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues;
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits duespaying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a
public business "facility'' in that it conducts its activities at
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at
768-774.
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided

83-724--0PINION
6

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d
1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees]
does," the organization's right to select its members is protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First
Amendment. ld., at 1570. It further decided that application of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership policies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id.,
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsible for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court concluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organization is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at
1573-1574.
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minnesota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Kiwanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act.
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "private" organizations from the "public accommodations" covered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1576-1578.
II

Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line
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of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particular, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor,
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to
consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive
association.
A
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Soci- 1
ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of
constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of

. "~
~-
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personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and
act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374,
383-386 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S.
494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S.
479, 482-485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at
535. See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S.
556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462
(1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, e. g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S.
246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations
on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and
sustenance of a family-marriage, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
supra; childbirth, e. g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
supra; the raising and education of children, e. g., Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation
with one's relatives, e. g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
supra. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep
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attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things,
therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, \
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to
reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element
of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these
qualities-such as a large business enterprise-seems remote
from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes
constraints on the State's power to control the selection of
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the
choice of one's fellow employees. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims
to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the
State. Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S.
160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not
mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with
any precision. We note only that factors that may be rele- \
vant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality,
and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent. In this case, however, several features of the Jay-

T
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cees clearly place the organization outside of the category of (
relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection.
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups. At the
time of the state administrative hearing, the Minneapolis
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local
chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for membership, and new members are routinely recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176.
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969)
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same).
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one
another, including many of the organization's various community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103.
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the
formation and maintenance of the association involves the
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly,
we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive
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characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to
the decision of its members to exclude women. We turn
therefore to consider the extent to which application of the
Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of expressive association.
B
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances could not
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290,
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g.
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977).
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or
withhold benefits from individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g.,

l
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Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to
express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
supra, at 234-235.
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 489;
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppression of speech, does not distinguish between prohibited and
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not license enforcement authorities to administer the statute on
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the
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Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hampering the organization's ability to express its views. Instead,
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768.
That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest
order.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an example of public accommodations laws that were adopted by
some States beginning a decade before enactment of their
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215,
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public
accommodations. !d., at 19, 25. In response to that decision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations. These laws provided the primary means for
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of California and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom discrimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In
1973, the Minnesota legislature added discrimination on the
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute.
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158,
2164.
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By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms.
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and
cultural life. See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These concerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, which forbids race
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently
because of their race.
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional
definition of public accommodations that reaches various
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forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W.
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy and of
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political
and social integration that have historically plagued certain
disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v.
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v.
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its conclusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minnesota court noted the various commercial programs and benefits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d,
at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state
interests.
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced
those interests through the least restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national
and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570;
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632
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(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or
philosophies different from those of its existing members.
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (recognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'").
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v.
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U. S., at 483.
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Appeals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women
members might have a different view or agenda with respect
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as
voting members will change the message communicated by
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported
by the record. In claiming that women might have a different attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a
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different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Although such generalizations may or may not have a statistical
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking that relies uncritically on such underlying assumptions. See, e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti, - - U. S. - - ,
- - - - - (1984); Heckler v. Mathews, - - U. S., at
- - - - - . In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge
in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 508 (1975).
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of
invidious discrimination cause unique evils that government
has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the
point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact, the actual practice of invidious discrimination by an
individual or group-as distinguished from its advocacy-is
entitled to no constitutional protection. Hishon v. King &
Spalding,-- U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976). Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982) (peaceful
picketing) with id., at 916 (violence). In prohibiting such
practices in the distribution of publicly available goods and
services, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds precisely to
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the substantive problem which legitimately concerns" the
State and abridges no more speech or associational freedom
than is necessary to accomplish that purpose. See City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, - - U.S. --,
(1984).
III
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minnesota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-forvagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v.
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). Therequirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U. S. - - , - - - - (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404
(1966).
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its
face or as construed in this case. In deciding that the Act
reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a
number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of
public facilities-typically employed in determining the applicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See,
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F. 2d 96
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(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N. J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33,
aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See generally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construction of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It nevertheless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a constitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "private" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals,
however, we read the illustrative reference to the Kiwanis
Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for
choosing members on the basis of specific and selective criteria, as simply providing a further refinement of the standards
used to determine whether an organization is "public" or "private." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). By offering
this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion provided the statute with more, rather than less, definite
content.
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's contention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the membership decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes.
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jaycees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W.
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt
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limiting constructions that would exclude private groups
from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act,
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk
of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct.
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982).
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part
in the decision of this case.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-724

KATHRYN R. ROBERTS, ACTING COMMISSIONER,
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
ET AL. v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address a conflict between a
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association asserted by members of a private organization. In the
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the organization's members. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - -, and now reverse.
I
A

The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees,
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue
"such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and development of young
men's civic organizations in the United States, designed
to inculcate in the individual m mbership of such orga-.{ I
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nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for personal development
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in the affairs of their community,
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men of all nations." Quoted
in Brief for Appellee 2.
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of membership, including individual or regular members, associate individual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while
associate membership is available to individuals or groups
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat
lower than those charged regular members, may not vote,
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards programs. The bylaws define a
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute
existing in any community within the United States, organized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each
local chapter, with a national president and board of directors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time
about 11,915 associate members. The national organization's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that
women associate members make up about two percent of the
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56.
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the
local chapters, although the state and national organizations
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and national organizations. The national headquarters employs a
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that
are designed to enhance individual development, community
development, and members' management skills. These materials include courses in public speaking and personal finances as well as community programs related to charity,
sports, and public health. The national office also makes
available to members a range of personal products, including
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts.
The programs, products, and other activities of the organization are all regularly featured in publications made available
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future."
B

In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of directors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation
of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years. The
national organization has imposed a number of sanctions on
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to count
their membership in computing votes at national conventions.
In December 1978, the president of the national organization advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the national board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women
from full membership required by the national organization's
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act),
which provides in part:

"It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. §363.03, subd. 3 (1982).
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." ld.,
§ 363.01, subd. 18.
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to believe that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner.
Before that hearing took place, however, the national organization brought suit against various state officials, appellants here, in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged
that, by requiring the organization to accept women as regular members, application of the Act would violate the male
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association.
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dismissed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be renewed in the event the state administrative proceeding resulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees.
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights Department hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclu-

83-724-0PINION
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES

5

sions oflaw. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees organization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered
the national organization to cease and desist from discriminating against any member or applicant for membership on
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minnesota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office of Hearing
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979)
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109.
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32.
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d
764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public business facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jaycees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues;
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits duespaying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a
public business "facility" in that it conducts its activities at
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at
768-774.
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d
1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees]
does," the organization's right to select its members is protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First
Amendment. I d., at 1570. It further decided that application of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership policies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id.,
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsible for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court concluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organization is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at
1573-1574.
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minnesota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Kiwanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act.
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "private" organizations from the "public accommodations" covered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act
unconstitutionally vague. !d., at 1576-1578.
II

Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line
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of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particular, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor,
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to
consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive
association.
A
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of
constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of
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personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and
act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374,
383-386 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S.
494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S.
479, 482-485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at
535. See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S.
556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462
(1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, e. g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S.
246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations
on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and
sustenance of a family-marriage, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
supra; childbirth, e. g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
supra; the raising and education of children, e. g., Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation
with one's relatives, e. g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
supra. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep
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attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things,
therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter,
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to
reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element
of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these
qualities-such as a large business enterprise-seems remote
from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes
constraints on the State's power to control the selection of
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the
choice of one's fellow employees. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims
to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the
State. Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S.
160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not
mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with
any precision. We note only that factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality,
and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent. In this case, however, several features of the Jay-
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cees clearly place the organization outside of the category of
relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection.
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups. At the
time of the state administrative hearing, the Minneapolis
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local
chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for membership, and new members are routinely recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176.
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969)
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same).
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one
another, including many of the organization's various community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103.
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the
formation and maintenance of the association involves the
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly,
we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive
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characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to
the decision of its members to exclude women. We turn
therefore to consider the extent to which application of the
Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of expressive association.

B
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances could not
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290,
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g.
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977).
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or
withhold benefits from individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g.,
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Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to
express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
supra, at 234-235.
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 489;
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppression of speech, does not distinguish between prohibited and
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not license enforcement authorities to administer the statute on
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the
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Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hampering the organization's ability to express its views. Instead,
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768.
That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest
order.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an example of public accommodations laws that were adopted by
some States beginning a decade before enactment of their
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215,
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public
accommodations. Id., at 19, 25. In response to that decision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations. These laws provided the primary means for
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of California and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom discrimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In
1973, the Minnesota legislature added discrimination on the
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute.
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158,
2164.
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By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms.
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and
cultural life. See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These concerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. ·C. § 2000a, which forbids race
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.' " Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently
because of their race.
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional
definition of public accommodations that reaches various
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forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W.
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy and of
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political
and social integration that have historically plagued certain
disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v.
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v.
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its conclusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minnesota court noted the various commercial programs and benefits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages'.... " 305 N. W. 2d,
at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state
interests.
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced
those interests through the least restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national
and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570;
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632
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(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or
philosophies different from those of its existing members.
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (recognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'").
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v.
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U. S., at 483.
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Appeals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women
members might have a different view or agenda with respect
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as
voting members will change the message communicated by
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported
by the record. In claiming that women might have a different attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a
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different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Although such generalizations may or may not have a statistical
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See,
e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti,-- U.S.--,----- (1984);
Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S., at-----. In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted
by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change
the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142,
151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498,
508 (1975).
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils
that government has a compelling interest to preventwholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from
their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no
constitutional protection. Hishon v. King & Spalding,-U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
175-176 (1976). Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982) (peaceful picketing) with
id., at 916 (violence). In prohibiting such practices, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds precisely to the substantive
problem which legitimately concerns" the State and abridges
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no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary to
accomplish that purpose. See City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, U. S. - , (1984).

III
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minnesota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-forvagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v.
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). Therequirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U.S.--,----(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404
(1966).
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its
face or as construed in this case. In deciding that the Act
reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a
number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of
public facilities-typically employed in determining the applicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See,
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F. 2d 96
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little
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League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33,
aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See generally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construction of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It nevertheless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a constitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "private" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals,
however, we read the illustrative reference to the Kiwanis
Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for
choosing members on the basis of specific and selective criteria, as simply providing a further refinement of the standards
used to determine whether an organization is "public" or "private." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). By offering
this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion provided the statute with more, rather than less, definite
content.
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's contention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the membership decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes.
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jaycees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W.
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt
limiting constructions that would exclude private groups
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from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act,
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk
of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct.
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982).
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.
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